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“[I]n these times of dreary crisis, what is the point of emphasising the horror of being?” Julia Kristeva1  
 
Introduction   
 
This paper outlines a tradition of Anglo-American literature that stretches from Jane Addams 
to Jack London and George Orwell.
 
Locating poverty law scholarship in this tradition of 
poverty writing has important implications for how we understanding lawyering for the poor 
and, indeed, for the very idea of law and literature.
2
 Borrowing the idea of unlearning from 
Jane Addams, we will show how reading literature is central to the moral task of self-
definition.3 It may be that poverty lawyering is best understood as peculiar continuation of a 
tradition of unlearning that defines the problematic of poverty writing.
4
 The argument 
concludes with comments on how the main themes of this essay can be framed as a kind of 
dialectics that pushes unlearning in the direction of a politics of poverty.
5
  
Our argument begins with the encounter between the ‘middle classes’ and the poor that 
underpinned the settlement house movement in the latter 1800s. The settlement house 
movement had its origins in the response of churchmen and university scholars to the social 
and spiritual degradation of slum life wrought by the industrial revolution. Profoundly 
impressed with the work of the settlement movement, Jane Addams resolved to repeat the 
social experiment in Chicago. Addams founded Hull House with her partner Ellen Gates Starr 
in 1889.  Addams saw Hull House as “an experimental effort to aid in the solution of the 
social and industrial problems which are engendered by the modern conditions of life in a 
great city.”6  Addams appreciated that the spiritual/educational mission of settlement could 
not be based on settlors imposing their understandings of morality on poor families. Those 
committed to working with the poor had to acquire a new understanding of morality. We will 
describe this process of revision as un-learning. Literature is central to un- learning as it 
provokes fundamental questions about one’s attitudes to others—particularly those who have 
fallen into poverty.
7
  
 
Whilst Addams’ texts are exemplary of unlearning, questions remain about the extent to 
which she could confront her own fundamental assumptions. We will trace this theme into 
Jack London’s The People of the Abyss. What sense can we find in London’s commitment to 
socialism after his experiences in the East End? A great deal is left unexamined.  With 
Orwell’s The Road to Wigan Pier, unlearning becomes somewhat more radical. From Orwell, 
we will turn to the new poverty law and focus on the work of Lucie White. Despite the very 
real differences between Orwell and White, we can use the latter’s critical voice to prompt 
critical questions about the former’s theory of poverty law.  Whilst White’s concepts of 
honesty, self-criticism and poverty lawyering as ‘piece work’ carry forward elements of 
unlearning the engagement with poverty is not pushed far enough. One is left with the sense 
that poverty lawyering is based on respecting one’s client and confronting the power games 
that are inherent in the encounter between a lawyer and a poor person. Questions remain 
about the extent to which this understanding allows the work on the self to engage with the 
abjection of being down and out and the politics of socialism that it throws up.
8
  
 
The Great Refusal   
 
Jane Addams inherited from the British pioneers of the settlement house movement, a 
profound concern with the need to inculcate a “moral sensibility” in the poor through her own 
actions.
9
  She well understood the nature of moral education as a form of work on one’s self.  
Asking her Quaker father to explain his faith, he talked of ‘inner honesty.’ How one judges 
oneself is of fundamental importance. One must constantly interrogate one’s actions and 
“moral concerns” in the intricate “maze” of existence.10  In the drama of the self’s passage 
through the world, God is found through the honesty with which one questions one’s self. 
The guiding principle is “the desire to live in a really living world and [to refuse] to be 
content with a shadowy intellectual or aesthetic reflection of it.” This raises something of a 
tension that Addams appreciated: the attempt to engage with experience through the 
abstraction of writing. In order for writing to remain authentic it must constantly relate back 
to practices of living. For instance, Addams makes reference to Dante’s "the great refusal.” A 
Dantean reference is not simply a display of classical learning. The great refusal is read as a 
lesson in engagement and honesty. The relevant canto from The Divine Comedy presents the 
fate of those who- out of cowardice-  refused to commit to a cause. The great refusal is 
invoked as a prompt to the self. Literature is a vehicle for working out the terms of one’s 
commitment.  
 
Addams is carried towards her commitment by her experiences in the East End of London. 
She was haunted by a strange sense of “intellectual futility” and “paralysis” during her grand 
tour of Europe. Although she was dedicated to her studies of art in Italy and Cathedrals in 
France and Germany she was frustrated by a sense of disconnection.
11
 Rather than abandon 
her work, Addams resorted to a process of unlearning. She becomes convinced that her 
education has separated her from an emotional life quicker and more vital than that found in 
the cloistered study of art history. The ‘active emotional life’ compels a response to the 
“suffering or helplessness” that could always break through the polite conventions of the 
middle class world. Addams reports that the sight of “heavy-laden market women and 
underpaid street labourers” confronted her with a sense of her own privilege and 
uselessness.”12  
 
This is an important scene, and one that will take us towards our considerations of London 
and Orwell. It points towards Addams’ account of her initiation into the “the wretchedness of 
East London.” The hands of the poor form a lasting impression: “myriads of hands, empty, 
pathetic, nerveless and workworn, showing white in the uncertain light of the street, and 
clutching forward for food which was already unfit to eat.”13  This image is an allusion to 
George Eliot’s The Spanish Gypsy where ‘the clasp of hands” expresses something like 
honesty. For Addams in this encounter with the East End- the spectacle of the hands, and, 
later the memory of this spectacle is the point of commitment to a cause. She speaks of the 
“despair and resentment which seized” her and lead to a question of what this experience 
might mean:    
 
“I carried with me for days at a time that curious surprise we experience when we first come 
back into the streets after days given over to sorrow and death; we are bewildered that the 
world should be going on as usual and unable to determine which is real, the inner pang or 
the outward seeming.”14  
 
This is perhaps the most significant articulation of the moral movement from outward 
experience to inward meaning and one that underlies the experience of settling amongst the 
poor at Hull House. Settlement, in this sense, requires the breakdown of rigid class divisions 
(whilst being careful not to go too far in the direction of socialism). Addams notes that those 
who joined her:  
 
“have been shut off from the common labor by which they live which is a great source of 
moral and physical health. They feel a fatal want of harmony between their theory and their 
lives, a lack of coördination between thought and action.
15
  
 
The settlors who joined Jane Addams feel isolated or ‘shut off’- distanced from common life 
and crippled by an emotional or even spiritual dissonance between “thought and action.” To 
coincide with oneself is bring together deeds and inner life. One must act so as to make a 
difference in the lives of those that suffer. We can thus find in Addams an articulation of the 
settlement ethos: a commitment to be alongside the poor. This is related to a sense of social 
service or social duty- and- in keeping with a Christian spirit an awareness that salvation is a 
matter of work, quite literally a matter of social work.  
 
Reading Twenty Years at Hull House one is struck by Addams’ focus on the profound sense 
of personal mission. Compared, say, to Jacob Riis’s descriptions of the horrors of the teeming 
tenements of New York, Addams does not appear to be particularly engaged with the filth of 
lives lived in poverty.
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 Certainly her approach avoids Riis’ sensationalism but compared to 
later poverty literature, it is as if there is no sense of the material abjection of poverty in 
Twenty Years at Hull House. Settlement life is a set of concrete tasks, running a kindergarten, 
organising boys’ clubs, sewing and reading groups. These are forms of social activity that 
decrease the distance between people and create a virtuous circle where good deeds breed 
good deeds. Twenty Years at Hull House remains a description of the personal struggle of a 
noble soul. Stressing the degraded filth of the poor might limit the terms of a philosophy 
which is focused on the construction of an inclusive community. Throughout her writings 
Addams wrestled with the unresolved tensions in her work. She was aware that her 
endeavours at Hull House both “challenged” and “reinforced the status quo.”17 Although 
increasingly committed to supporting working class struggles and causes, Addams tended to 
think that “ethical fellowship” and “moral revolution” would transcend the tensions between 
capital and the workers’ sense of “shared injury.”18 The wake of the Pullman Strike 
compelled further troubled reflections. We can indeed read the celebrated essay The Modern 
Lear as a work of unlearning. Literature provides a resource for critical thought. Addams 
argued that industrial conflict could be understood as a form of family tragedy. But was this 
approach adequate to the political realities of the strike? Addams continued to assert that 
social peace required spiritual rather than social transformation, but perhaps her very 
reluctance to move beyond a literary analysis limited her own critical perspective.
19
  
 
Into the Abyss 
 
If Addams attempted to bridge the gulf that separated the classes, then the title of London’s 
book suggests that the distances involved may be greater than Addams had calculated. It 
might indeed be interesting that London makes no real references or allusions to Dante. 
Certainly the frame of reference has shifted. London reverses Addams’ experiment. Instead 
of announcing his presence, his desire to help, he goes into the East End in disguise, like an 
“explorer.”20 This simile is important. It suggests the social distance between the narrator and 
the experiences of those whose lives he narrates. London’s narrative is an account of a 
movement from disconnection to a measure of sympathy. This theme is caught up with other 
metaphors in the book and the general organisation of the text. The opening metaphor in The 
Descent is that of the squalid crowds of the East End, the “miserable multitudes.” The slum 
houses “street upon street” were “so many waves of a vast and malodorous sea, lapping about 
me and threatening to well up and over me.”21 When, however, the narrator has dressed 
himself in old clothes and walked back into the East End, the “fear” was no longer there. 
Rather, he “slipped gently” into “the vast and malodorous sea.”22  
 
London describes the poorest of the poor in Spitalfields Gardens where the homeless doss on 
benches. Individuals and families, fathers asleep on their daughters, babies apparently 
abandoned. Repulsive bodies posed in grotesque postures- and as the narrator is told- the 
women will “sell themselves for thru'pence, or tu'pence, or a loaf of stale bread.”23 To be 
poor is to deprived of privacy, to have lost the means that allows one to appear decently in 
public. Indeed, although the poorest of the poor are condemned to be visible in public places, 
they are also ‘moved on’ by the Police– prevented from coming to rest. But poverty is not 
just a public plight. It is a malady of the soul. The abyss of poverty “seems to exude a 
stupefying atmosphere of torpor…a “deadly inertia that precedes dissolution.” The time of 
the poor seems to repeat itself in cycles of deprivation and suffering: “[i]n their own lives 
they may only start to fall, leaving the fall to be completed by their children and their 
children's children.”24  The abyss is internalised, it becomes a deadening to the self; the 
lowering of horizons that means that nothing changes and nothing develops: “[m]an always 
gets less than he demands from life; and so little do they demand, that the less than little they 
get cannot save them.” If we are no more than our circumstances, to live in a slum is to 
disappear from yourself or to want from life no more than “booze” – the intoxication that 
makes it bearable. Amongst the denizens of the slums the narrator encounters something else.  
 
Disguised in the cheap clothes he bought on his first expedition to Stepney, London can no 
longer be identified as a member of the upper classes to be ‘fawned’ upon. He discovers a 
“comradeship” that surprises him as he meets “the English lower classes face to face” in 
circumstances where they could be known “for what they were.” In these encounters the poor 
“talked with me, they talked as one man to another, and they talked as natural men should 
talk, without the least idea of getting anything out of me for what they talked or the way they 
talked.” This is a peculiar trope. The becoming poor is necessary for the re-discovery of the 
“natural man”- and a kind of honest talk where nothing is hidden (which is, of course, based 
on the narrator’s dishonesty- he is a ‘researcher’- a visitor from abroad- an American 
disguised as a poor man). No longer the explorer, he is now involved in the world of poor 
men.  London cannot keep his distance. Like Addams, London wants to coincide with 
himself in honest talk with others. Honest talk is not aimed at signifying social authority or 
stressing the social gulf that exists between the rich and the poor.   
 
At the same time London does not appear to be quite authentic to his experience. Whilst it 
would be hard to disagree with his concluding argument that “[c]ivilisation must be 
compelled to better the lot of the average man” he has not engaged in any detail with the 
peculiar dynamic of disguise and true identity.
25
 Indeed, he cannot engage in honest talk 
without revealing his identity. On being turned away from Poplar Workhouse, and out of 
desperation, he chooses to spend his ‘emergency fund’ with his two companions. As soon as 
they know that he is a “social researcher” – the old comradeship ends. Diffidence and “class 
consciousness” creep in. After a meal he leaves his companions on a street corner and departs 
thinking of “the washboard ribs over which I had run my hand.”26 This is an interesting 
image- recalling that of the hands of the poor in Jane Addams’ writing. For London, it is very 
much an image of an encounter with reality; and of a witnessing (with distinct theological 
echoes).  
 What does London make of this experience? What does it mean to have run his hands over a 
starving man’s ribs? Writing some two years after finishing People of the Abyss, London 
produced a text that went beyond the rather abstract final chapter of his earlier book. The 
People of the Abyss concluded with some extended political meditation on the poor as the 
victims of a system over which they have no influence. The poor are a kind of vague mass for 
which one can retain an oceanic sympathy. In the later text, the image of the pit or the abyss 
returns but now in the context of a profound personal change. London mixes together the 
secular and the spiritual to explain how he was ‘reborn’ as a socialist. Elaborating the story of 
his transformation he recounts how he “ran to” books in an attempt to understand what he 
was going through, only to dismiss reading as a rather secondary way of understanding what 
had already happened. He unlearnt himself:  
 
“[s]ince that day I have opened many books, but no economic argument, no lucid 
demonstration of the logic and inevitableness of Socialism affects me as profoundly and 
convincingly as I was affected on the day when I first saw the walls of the Social Pit rise 
around me and felt myself slipping down, down, into the shambles at the bottom.”27  
 
The experiences that remain rather abstract in The People of the Abyss are now linked to a 
much more profound sense of personal change. The abyss, the social pit, is a striking 
metaphor of a dizzying fall into the horrific chaos of poverty. Yet, How I Became A Socialist 
is a strangely disappointing text. London gives no real sense of how his experience in the 
“shambles” of other people’s lives confronted him with a real political problem. To get a grip 
on this theme, we will turn to George Orwell. 
 
The Misery of Others  
 
We can read Orwell’s work as an engagement with a problem inherited from London: what 
chance is there for sympathy and fellowship between people of different classes? If one is 
even vaguely acquainted with Orwell’s writing, his peculiar habit of ‘tramping’ will be 
familiar. It is a direct borrowing from London as Orwell himself acknowledged.  But, there is 
a much greater reflexivity in Orwell’s writing than there is in London’s work. Orwell quickly 
became impatient with the idea of being disguised. Indeed, the key text on which we will 
focus is ‘mature’ to the degree that Orwell had cast off whatever residual sense of adventure 
lead him to follow London’s example. Orwell sees the necessary work on the self as long 
term and serious: “I have got to alter myself so completely that at the end I should hardly be 
recognisable as the same person.”28 This line, which strangely echoes the conclusion of 
Coetzee’s Disgrace, describes Orwell’s desire to be erased and made new….ultimately to 
“abolish part of the self” - to start again. 29  
 
Authentic writing is related to this problematic. Orwell has a fear that words cannot get at the 
real awfulness of human suffering. Commenting on the notes that he took in Wigan, Orwell 
writes:   
 
 “…..as I read them they bring back what I have seen, but they cannot in themselves give 
much idea of what conditions are like in those fearful northern slums. Words are such feeble 
things. What is the use of a brief phrase like 'roof leaks' or 'four beds for eight people'? It is 
the kind of thing your eye slides over, registering nothing. And yet what a wealth of misery it 
can cover!”30  
 
How can writing stop the reader’s eyes sliding over the ‘misery’ that is out there. Most 
importantly, the point of Orwell’s writing is to stop the eye becoming blind to other people’s 
misery: “[h]ousing shortage' is a phrase that has been bandied about pretty freely since the 
war, but it means very little to anyone with an income of more than £10 a week, or even £5 a 
week for that matter.”31 ‘Shortage’ means so much more that a lack of supply. To use the 
word authentically, one cannot ‘bandy’ the term around. For Orwell this starts with detailed 
description but good writing is more than simply description. Good writing comes from the 
arrested eye of the true witness. We might even say that good writing is a moral exercise in 
working out how and why one has ‘slid’ over the misery of others. This involves something 
like a politics, or, at least an understanding of the effects of ‘the industrial system’ on people.  
 
We can examine this theme in relation to two essential concerns: the ‘housing question’ and 
unemployment. Homelessness – or living in reduced circumstances- is a major register of the 
experience of being poor. This concern runs through Orwell’s work, from the early 
publications such as How the Poor Die- to the first descriptions of his ‘tramping’ in The Spike 
and The Common Lodging House. In The Road to Wigan Pier, the common lodging house re-
appears and is the locus of a particular kind of filth, stagnation and paralysis. Consider the 
first chapter of The Road to Wigan Pier.  
 
We are in a bedroom in a filthy tripe shop and lodging house ran by the complaining and 
mean spirited Brookers and populated by a caste of derelicts. The chapter evokes a very 
particular sense of waste, boredom and decay. First of all, there are “generally” four lodgers 
whose beds are crammed together in what was “still recognisably a drawing room.” The point 
is that this is not “shabby genteel.” Nor is it the filth of the tramps with whom Orwell had 
spent time on the road. The filth and broken down furniture that fills the room is the 
correlative of a particular working class type. Their quality is summed up in details. Mrs 
Brooker “lay permanently ill, festooned in grimy blankets”32 although “her only real trouble 
was over-eating.” Her husband- who runs both the lodging house and the tripe shop, is full of 
“brooding resentment” as if there was “fermenting in him…. a kind of bitter juice.”33  What 
stands out is that he is “astonishingly dirty.”34 He left his dirty fingerprints all over the food 
that was served up in the filthy, frusty kitchen which smelt “dreadfully.”35  Despite the filth 
and “the dusty flyblown air”36 of the shop, neither Brooker can understand why they have no 
customers and spend their time in resentful criticisms of their lodgers and “self-pitying”37 
reflections on situation of their lives with the repeated phrase “it does seem ‘ard, don’t it 
now.”38   
 
The Brookers are not particularly poor by local standards and are probably reasonably well 
off.  Orwell is clearly drawing attention to some broader failing of character:  
 
“The most dreadful thing about people like the Brookers is the way they say the same things 
over and over again. It gives you the feeling that they are not real people at all, but a kind of 
ghost for ever rehearsing the same futile rigmarole….But it is no use saying that people like 
the Brookers are just disgusting and trying to put them out of mind. For they exist in tens and 
hundreds of thousands; they are one of the characteristic by-products of the modern world.”39  
 
The entire cast of this first chapter are ghosts or non-persons rehearing futile and wasted 
lives. The Road to Wigan Pier pits the sensibility of the writer against what is revolting and 
meaningless. People are trapped in poverty, unable to develop- unable- in a real sense- to 
become an object of their own thoughts and to criticise themselves in any meaningful way. 
This degradation cannot be put ‘out of mind.’ Poverty is a problem of modern civilisation- a 
phrase that comes in for criticism from Orwell for its own deadness. It’s a pat phrase, a stock 
expression that performs an attitude and repeats endlessly what others say. Go back to the 
details.  
 
It is not just the condition of common lodging houses that confront us with the reality of 
poverty:  
 
“[A]s you walk through the industrial towns you lose yourself in labyrinths of little brick 
houses blackened by smoke, festering in planless chaos round miry alleys and little cindered 
yards where there are stinking dust-bins and lines of grimy washing and half-ruinous w.c.s”  
 
Again we come across the metaphor of the labyrinth- here serving to point up the ‘planless’ 
chaos. This metaphor is a long way from Addams’ sense of the moral challenges that the 
world provides and that can be overcome. The poor that Orwell describes seem to have fallen 
much further than those that Addams tried to save. The poor have become almost inhuman:  
 
“…. some [houses] were so appalling that I have no hope of describing them adequately. To 
begin with, the smell, the dominant and essential thing, is indescribable.”40  
 
Words might fail, but these ‘miry alleys’ and yards are dwelling places. These are houses 
without individuality- too small, lacking in facilities, badly built, unhealthy and overcrowded: 
a complex that feeds into the metaphor of filth. This is the ‘index’ of these various failings. 
Filth describes both the houses and the people who live in them. But, there are different forms 
of filth. There is the miner covered in coal dust who has to wash in a tin bath in the ‘front 
parlour’ (the builder saved “perhaps ten pounds on each house”41  by not installing a “hot 
water system). Then there is the filth and untidiness occasioned by overcrowding (Orwell 
blames children for this squalor–“the determining factor is perhaps the number of children”).  
There are also ‘bugs.’ Most of the houses that Orwell investigates and reports on have 
infestations and the first thing that the corporation does when it demolishes property and 
moves the tenants to a flat is to fumigate them and their belongings. Bugs are a different kind 
of ‘filth’- partly because they have their own agency. Despite one’s best efforts, a house can 
become infested and a person lousy. Dirt, then, is poverty.  
 
Orwell writes:  
 
“The dirt and congestion of these places is such that you cannot well imagine it unless you 
have tested it with your own eyes and more particularly your nose.”42  
 
Being amongst the poor allows Orwell to witness their condition. The truth of his witness is 
the record of his own senses. We can trace these themes into Orwell’s consideration of 
unemployment. To understand mass unemployment one has to understand a ‘system’ where a 
loss of markets puts millions of people out of work- and – this fact is then either ignored or 
downplayed. Orwell is primarily interested in these systemic effects of industrial production
43
  
not however, at the expense of engaging with the individual, qualitative experiences of being 
out of work. Many people experience unemployment for periods so extended as to make it 
seem unlikely that they will work again, the experience of poverty becomes general. The 
horizons of life are those of life on the dole.  
 
Orwell contrasts this culture, this death in life, with his own work: writing. He notes that:   
 
“[T]o write books you need not only comfort and solitude- and solitude is never easy to 
obtain in a working class home- you also need peace of mind. You can’t settle to anything, 
you can’t command the spirit of hope in which anything has got to be created, with that dull 
evil cloud of unemployment hanging over you.”44  
 
To write, to stand back and think. If daily life is spent keeping warm then one cannot ‘think’ 
a way out of the circumstances in which one finds oneself. A long time before Loïc 
Wacquant, Orwell was investigating poverty as an ethos, and the great division in social life. 
The settlement movement had not mended this social divide. It had produced a great deal of 
empty rhetoric (especially amongst left wing middle class intellectuals) and the kind of 
“yearly summer camp” where “public school boys and boys from the slums are supposed to 
mix on exactly equal terms.”45 Unlearning requires a much more profound examination of the 
assumptions that one makes about the worlds of the poor. It is a theme bound up with the 
moral work of a writer. Writing is not only the figure of faithful record—it is a metaphor for 
honest self-examination.  
 
Orwell goes further than Addams or London. This is perhaps why the latter sections of The 
Road to Wigan Pier have been found so difficult to read, in particular the extended 
meditations on the smell of the poor. We can now see them as exercises in unlearning – a 
working through a set of received attitudes and unexplored assumptions. What is the use a 
disguise to ‘pal’ up with the poor? Certainly, Orwell can see that travelling into the world of 
the poor is a journey into the self. He writes that witnessing poverty was a way of testing 
himself. He presents himself with a profound moral challenge: “…how one could sell 
everything, give everything away, change one’s name and start out with no money and 
nothing by the clothes one stood up in…”46 How could one unlearn oneself?  
 
Whilst this is perhaps for most a somewhat strange endeavour, the more we reflect upon it we 
begin to identify a very peculiar feature of Orwell’s text. Could we perhaps refer to the 
pleasure/pain couplet at work in Orwell’s writing? The Road to Wigan Pier is just that, a 
passage from North to South, from a poverty invisible to the stockbrokers of Surrey to 
Orwell’s personal engagement and witnessing of the awful reality of the Great Depression. 
Orwell finds himself in a situation that repels him. His pain, repulsion and disgust are bound 
up with the peculiar pleasure of beginning a work that is at the same time the discovery of his 
voice as a writer, and indeed, the beginning of his commitment to a certain kind of politics.  
Having been with the poor, Orwell feels that he can make authentic political decisions. For 
instance, the Brookers remain symbols of a kind of person surrendered to poverty. There is 
no sentimentality in Orwell’s attitude towards them. The poor are not objects to be saved by 
the middle classes. His contempt for the filth into which they have fallen contrasts, for 
example, with his admiration for the work of the “ragged men” of the National Unemployed 
Workers' Movement who organised the poor and helped to restore at least a semblance of 
dignity to the lives of the long term unemployed.  
 
Orwell’s “guilt….drop[ed] from” [him]47 because he worked out a way to make it creative. 
Orwell’s own transformation, his ‘becoming a socialist’, took him from Wigan to Spain. The 
complexity of this theme means that we cannot explore it in the present essay. In the terms of 
this essay, we need to see Orwell’s work as something of a mediating point between poverty 
writing and our encounter with the theory of poverty lawyering— this most recent version of 
the moral difficulties of being with the poor. The main point for the moment is that poverty 
writing reaches a peculiar intensity with Orwell. After Orwell the settlement house movement 
and London’s adventuring have to be read in a different way. This opens an interesting 
tension in poverty writing, and takes us to a particular ‘sub-genre’ of the field: the writings of 
poverty lawyers.  
 
The Ethics of the Dust   
 
Of all the scholars of the new poverty law, White appears to be closest to the tradition that we 
have been outlining above. There are, of course, major differences between White’s 
descriptions of her work as a poverty lawyer in the “Jim Crow” America of the 1980s and 
1990s and the poverty of the 1920s or the 1930s. It is also significant that White’s work is 
divided from Orwell’s by the profound historical experience that have seen the general 
compromise (if not collapse) of the diverse political initiatives that lead to the post war 
invention of the European welfare state and the American quasi welfare state. In more 
immediate terms, White’s writing is rooted in the failure of the War against Poverty and the 
grass roots welfare rights movement. However, it is also important to see that White is 
carrying forward central themes from poverty writing. White’s work attempts to articulate an 
account of poverty law from the perspective of an honest poverty lawyer.
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 This sensibility is, 
at least in part, informed by lessons learned by reading and studying literature. Admittedly, 
neither George Eliot nor Dante appear in White’s work. There is, however, an engagement 
with literature. Literature is fundamental to the articulation of White’s belief in “critique as 
the grounds of moral action.”49 It is worth thinking in some detail about what this claim.  
 
First of all, the use of the word ‘moral’ relates White back to the tradition of poverty law 
writing. An honest sensibility is engaged with the “difficulty” of working for the poor. White 
rejects the idea that poverty law can be understood as ‘serving’ a class of people who need 
some kind of missionary help (whether or not White escapes from certain elements of the 
settlement ethos is a question to which we will return). The acknowledgement of difficulty, 
the importance of being honest with oneself, takes us to the ideas of theory and critique. She 
confesses that “[w]hen I was working at Legal Aid, I used to read critical thinkers like 
Foucault and Derrida.”50 However, this is not to fetishize names. Reading sharpens up what 
one does:  
 
 “Theory is the ongoing practice of reflection among the communities of poor people and 
their allies that are constituted by the work they come together to do. This kind of theoretical 
practice.... is enacted in those elusive moments of insight that mark good conversations, or in 
those tactical innovations that work.”51  
 
Suffice to say that theory provides a form of auto-analysis: a way of confronting and thinking 
about how one plays a social and professional role.  Theory, in this sense, is learned from 
Barthes, feminist legal thinking and Rosa Parks’ reflections on her civil rights activism. It 
compels White to a central question.  
 
How do we become open to experience rather than trapped in rehearsed social roles? The 
whole point is that this kind of examination can only be done by examining the self. The 
language of faith that guides Addams is not useful to White. We could say that theory helps 
her to understand her subject position as a white middle class woman in a way that builds on 
Orwell’s investigations of class. Theory, is thus something of an approach to unlearning as it  
de-centres professionalism. White argues that it is necessary to step out of “everyday 
routines” to engage with how you think of yourself. 52 Working through this complex means 
identifying some sense of character that can resist “subtle, internalised voices of obligation.” 
These inner voices repeat a script of “fear” about what “our parents, teachers, peers, or the 
larger society will think about the work we do.”53  White’s guiding question is “[w]hat kinds 
of activity give you the sense of being the person you want to become?”54 How one can 
construct an honest version of oneself that seems the most authentic or least compromised?  
 
One needs a guiding intimation of what one should be:  
 
“For me, it has taken over ten years of post-law school experimentation to pull the many 
threads of my own vocational identity into a coherent lawyering job. Perhaps the most 
prominent of these diverse threads has been a puzzling need to listen hard as people seek to 
make sense of their troubles and their lives.”55  
 
The guiding intimation is the difficult ‘puzzling need’ to listen to others and to ‘make sense’ 
of their lives. The puzzle is a variation on the theme of the moral labyrinth introduced to us 
by Jane Addams. Even in committing oneself to ‘a calling’ there is no real sense of certainty 
that one is doing the right thing. Is there ever any way in which we can make sense of the 
lives of other people? This statement opens onto the same complex that we found in poverty 
writing. How does one cross a boundary and shake up one’s sense of self? There are no easy 
fixes. As we know nothing comes out of ‘paling up’ with the poor. One has to be aware, in 
White’s terminology, that there is a professional and biographical distance that separates the 
lawyer from her poor client- a theme that clearly resonates in a general way with our thinking 
about both London and Orwell.  
 
White develops a practice of listening to others as a way of navigating these hazards. It is a 
technique based on a principle of Martin Luther King: understand those with whom you are 
working before you devise plans and programmes together. Applied to a lawyer’s work, this 
principle requires some engagement with the social context of one’s client. One must “[g]et 
involved in the life of the community.”56 Anyone familiar with the ‘hurt and pain’ of 
organising will realise that acting on this principle demands hard work and personal 
resilience. The practice of poverty law involves:  
 
“…a willingness to let what one hears from the other disrupt one's own perspective and revise 
one's commitments. It is a practice toward the other that seeks first of all simply to perceive 
the other's certainty in its own terms, and then to allow that certainty to challenge one's 
own.”57 
 
It is important to listen to others so that one’s own view is “disrupted.” However, is the 
“certainty” of the other quite the right way of thinking about this disruption? As Orwell might 
suggest, one would want to argue with the likes of the Brookers. Surely it would be better not 
to fetishize any emotional register that limits one’s response to the other. We need to follow 
White “deeper and deeper” into the mysteries of our relations with others: 58  
 
“We must seek, in our encounters with others, not just to map the power or read the text, but 
also to recognize, in all its alterity, the other's face”59  
 
We need to engage with the unique-ness of the other- as exemplified in the face of the person 
to whom one is listening. The other person’s uniqueness is their infinite difference and 
distance from us. White seeks the authority of philosophy to justify her practice.
60
 However, 
whilst this might be a compelling way of thinking about ethics, but it is the best way of 
understanding unlearning?  
 
The philosophical or ethical tendency in White’s work exists alongside a more explicitly 
political analysis.
61
 Reading White after Orwell leaves one with the sense in which such 
practical, pragmatic political tasks are a long way from an ethics orientated to being “held 
hostage by the other.” It is as if we come across a similar tension to the one that we have 
found in Addams. To what extent does White’s commitment to a philosophy of the noble soul 
prevent unlearning? At what point does White need to make the kind of distinction that 
Orwell made between the likes of the Brookers and the ragged political activists of the 
NUWM? White’s notion of moral action as “situated piece work”62 presents itself as an idea 
that could obtain purchase on such concerns. Piece work is rooted in ‘what works.’ ‘What 
works’ is found in “elusive moments of good conversation” and tactical innovation where 
people work together. Practices of listening to others and self-examination militate against 
the piece worker confusing convivial ways of working with imposition of his or her own 
class power. Whilst this may be important, it seems too polite- something like the well-
meaning efforts of the settlement summer schools denounced by Orwell.
63
  
 
Just as Orwell had to work through his class position to reach a kind of authenticity, White 
works at her own professional status. There is some peculiar dialectic in these experiences- 
and one perhaps better realised (if it can be realised at all) by Orwell rather than White. In 
becoming down and out, abject, and with the poor Orwell encounters something primordial. 
It is certainly bound up with voice, writing and identity. Un learning means becoming a new 
object for oneself whilst sustaining a negation of one’s self. Redemption, for Orwell, means 
getting as close as possible to what disgust you: the smells, dirt and shit of the poor: bad 
grammar, bad breath, poor reading habits, the toleration of boredom and poor teeth. This 
seems to go beyond the career choice to become a poverty lawyer. The poverty lawyer is 
ultimately shielded from the grimness of poverty by his/her professional role and frustrated 
by the limits which enable the engagement with the lives of the poor in the first place.  
 
What does seem clear is that unlearning begins with desiring to be otherwise.  However, just 
because one might be able to negate one’s own class position, doesn’t mean that one single 
individuals’ poverty has become any easier to bear. Unlearning opens a more  
profound dilemma, the difficult passage from the engagement with poverty to a political 
position. The whole experience is overwhelming- exorbitant- a “delirium that stops one going 
mad.”64 It is indeed intriguing that the image of the abyss, central to poverty law writing, 
figures as the central metaphor of the passage to the delirium of politics in the theory of 
abjection. The passage through the abyss, the engagement with the poverty of others, might 
thus offer itself as the thematic of poverty writing. To the extent that this is a question of 
writing, and, ultimately literary writing rather than reflection on law, it directs us towards the 
political challenge of a kind of hybrid text: a peculiar hybrid of reflection, theology, social 
science, field notes and memory work. Such troubled texts do not act as a handmaiden to the 
law or to lawyers who want to understand their experiences helping the poor. They force us 
to go elsewhere.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Unlearning, with its dialectical negation of forms of identification, retains the abject as it is 
an open ended delirious project.
65
 The delirium is the dizziness of the subject attempting to 
steady his or her own ego in commitment to a political cause: a “security blanket” no doubt- 
but a course of action which at least gives the comforting sense that you are trying to do 
something about the “senseless abyss.”66 The comfort blanket is also the blanket issued to the 
POUM volunteers in the trenches above Huesca, the road from Wigan Pier led Orwell 
directly to the volunteering for the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War. To unlearn, in 
this sense, is to find a form of personal redemption in a political delirium. We have, in this 
way, been following the general contour of a particular form of becoming political. Perhaps – 
for all the theoretical sophistication of the various definitions of poverty law
67
- the truth is 
both simpler and more dreadful. The engagement with poverty is a working through of one’s 
own disgust with one’s self and with ‘the system.’ If not the journey to the end of the night, 
then the road from Wigan Pier.  
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